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Abstract: This article considers the intractable conflicts and human rights
situations in Darfur, Sudan and South Sudan, respectively, against the
international responses they elicited. Intractable conflicts are conflicts that have
lasted for a long time with resistance to settlement despite various attempts at
intervention and conciliation. These conflicts from neighbouring nations have
both elicited extensive engagement from the international and regional
communities but, while some clarity regarding the direction to be taken has been
achieved in the case of South Sudan, the situation in Darfur remains dire. The
article analyses the difference in the peace-building approaches in the two
conflicts and how these approaches have contributed to the different outcomes in
Darfur and South Sudan. Following an exposition of intractability in the
introduction, the second section applies the factors identified to the case of
Darfur, confirming that this indeed is an intractable situation. It then considers
the international response to the conflict in Darfur and the mechanisms
employed by the global and the regional community in an attempt to address
this conflict. The third section considers the situation in South Sudan and the
international response, noting that efforts were led by the regional and sub-
regional bodies, with the UN’s role being to complement these efforts. The
methodology employed is a comparative analysis, in which the international
and regional legal and institutional responses to the crisis in South Sudan are
analysed with a view to identifying the lessons to be applied in addressing the
situation in Darfur, utilising theoretical and functional approaches to legal and
political interventions. The final section draws from the insights gained in
comparing the international response in Darfur and South Sudan, and concludes
by attempting to extract general principles about intractability and the
effectiveness of international responses to situations considered to be intractable,
noting in particular the importance of regional and sub-regional bodies taking
the lead in efforts to resolve intractable conflicts.
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1 Introduction
Intractable conflicts are conflicts that have lasted for a long time with
resistance to settlement despite various attempts at intervention and
conciliation. The article considers the conflicts in South Sudan and Darfur,
Sudan, which have both elicited extensive engagement from international
and regional communities, in an attempt to analyse the difference in the
peace-building approaches in the two conflicts and to understand how
these approaches have contributed to the different outcomes in Darfur and
South Sudan. 
This introduction considers the general definition of intractable
conflicts and the characteristics or factors that make a situation intractable.
The second section applies the factors identified to the case of Darfur,
confirming that this indeed is an intractable situation. It then considers the
international response to the conflict in Darfur and the mechanisms
employed by the global and the regional community in an attempt to
address this conflict, including United Nations (UN) Security Council
resolutions, international sanctions, and responses from the African Union
(AU). The third section considers the situation in South Sudan and the
international response, noting that, while the peace process in South
Sudan is mainly led by the sub-regional trade bloc, the Inter-Governmental
Authority on Development (IGAD), and the AU, the global community led
by the UN has played a crucial role in complementing these efforts. The
methodology employed is a comparative analysis, in which the
international and regional legal and institutional responses to the crisis in
South Sudan are analysed with a view to identifying the lessons to be
applied in addressing the situation in Darfur, utilising theoretical and
functional approaches to legal and political interventions. The final section
draws from the insights gained in comparing the international response in
Darfur and South Sudan, and concludes by attempting to extract general
principles about intractability and the effectiveness of international
responses to situations considered to be intractable.
Simply stated, intractable conflicts may be defined as conflicts that have
lasted for a long time with resistance to settlement, despite the various
responses from different stakeholders (Crocker et al 2005: 5). Crocker et
al argue that a conflict becomes intractable due to factors that include the
geographic location of the conflict; the level of willingness to accept
settlement; unsuccessful peace-making efforts; historical grievances; and a
lack of social cohesion. In identifying the nature of intractable conflict,
Kriesberg (2005: 65) provides three elements: First, an intractable conflict
is a conflict that is complex by its nature and persists for a long time;
second, it is considered to be destructive by observers; and, third, various
interventions fail to solve the conflict. In addition, any kind of support to
either of the armed groups involved contributes to the protracted nature of
a situation (Wallensteen & Sollenberg 1998: 621). Further elaborating on
the characteristics of intractable conflicts, Bercovitch (2003) analyses
intractability in terms of actors, issues, duration, relationship, geopolitics
and management. Accordingly, he concludes that intractable conflicts
involve actors who have long-standing complaints on issues of identity,
recognition or values, which complaints persist for a long period causing
mass atrocity and violence. In addition, he indicates that such conflicts
occur among two significant groups, and these groups usually resist
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peaceful settlement, leading to failed peace-keeping efforts. However, the
intractability of conflicts does not mean that they cannot be settled at all,
as there are possibilities through which they can be resolved (Coleman
2006: 533). In fact, the termination of and recovery from intractable
conflicts are identified by Kriesberg (2005) to be the last phase of an
intractable conflict. Kriesberg summarises the phases of intractable
conflicts as starting with the outbreak of the conflict; followed by an
escalation of violence; followed by the unsuccessful settlement of
mediation efforts; followed by the institutionalisation of the conflict;
followed by the de-escalation of the conflict; and, finally, the termination
of the conflict (Kriesberg 2005: 72). An intractable conflict, thus, in simple
terms may be defined as a conflict that has existed for a considerable time
between strong military groups that have no interest in settling their
dispute, and who often have external support enabling them to continue
their conflict, seemingly indefinitely, with no clear resolution in sight.
Intractable conflicts persist in a number of countries on the African
continent, but the article is limited to two of these conflicts that have
elicited significant responses from the international community, namely
that in the Darfur region of Sudan and the protracted conflict in South
Sudan.
2 Failure of interventions in the intractable conflict in Darfur, 
Sudan
Intractable conflicts are demoralising. Apart from destabilising the
families, communities and international regions in which they occur, they
tend to perpetuate the very conditions of misery and hate that in the first
place contributed to these conflicts (Vallacher et al 2010: 262).
The conflict in Darfur, which continues to this day, reached its peak in
February 2003 and was widespread in the north, west and south (Hagan &
Palloni 2006: 1578). The main conflict is between the Sudanese armed
forces, on the one hand, and the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the two groups that had rebelled
against the central government due to what they perceived as
marginalisation, on the other (Brosché 2008: 7). The Janjaweed militia, a
group believed to be affiliated with and supported by the government, also
joined the government in attacking SLM and JEM (Salih 2008: 8). The
three Darfur tribes of Fur, Massalit, and Zaghawa, including civilians, were
the main victims of the conflict, which resulted in killings, rape, abduction
and the destruction of property and welfare infrastructure (Brosché &
Rothbart 2013). Since its independence in 1946, Sudan has witnessed
successive civil wars, including the north-south conflict as well as conflicts
in the Nuba Mountains, the Upper Blue Nile, and the Beja region (Sikainga
2009). The conflict in Darfur erupted due to grievances over historical
marginalisation and, in particular, over the use and control of natural
resources in the region (Sakainga 2009). The intractability of the Darfur
conflict is further entrenched by the fact that various peace-keeping
missions, attempts at settlement and even the indictment by the
International Criminal Court (ICC) of the President for war crimes have
failed to resolve the conflict, which continues to have a devastating effect
on the lived realities of millions of people. This international response
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directed towards resolving the conflict and their failure is discussed in the
next section.
An important factor which has contributed to the intractability of the
Darfur conflict is that it is not a single conflict of a group rebelling against
marginalisation by the centre; rather, ‘communal conflicts’ underpin the
existing conflict (Mohamed 2009: 8). There are three main conflicts: an
inter-groups conflict; region-centred conflict; and communal elite conflict
(Mohamed 2009: 8). The inter-group conflict mainly is a fight over
resources and land by different local groups. During the past few decades,
Darfur has witnessed drought and desertification which have led to the
displacement of nomadic communities in Darfur (Salih 2008: 7). The
nomads fled to the territories of the sedentary tribes, and this gave rise to
conflict over resources between the nomads and farmers of sedentary
tribes (Salih 2008: 7). This conflict had been settled for some time but has,
however, re-emerged in the past few years (Salih 2008: 8). The region-
centre conflict was prompted by the marginalisation of non-Arabic people
by the central government. Almost all government regimes in Sudan have
thus far neglected the Darfur people’s quest for human and economic
development, resulting in the underdevelopment and marginalisation of a
relatively resource-rich region (Bassil 2004: 26). Adding to the complexity
is the power struggle among the local rebel groups pitting the Arabs
against the non-Arab communities (Crisis Group 2015a). Finally, the
communal-elite conflict is the result of conflict among the elite of the rural
communities particularly over the holding of political positions (Mohamed
2009: 8). Taken together, it is clear that these overlapping and often
opposing conflicts of interest could lead to a physical conflict such as the
one which currently exists, which is difficult to disentangle and resolve.
Another factor that contributes to the intractability of the conflict in
Darfur is the cross-border effect on neighbouring countries, an example
being Chad where the Janjaweed have crossed the border, attacked
civilians and caused displacement of many people (Bercault 2007: 859).
This changes the nature of the conflict from a non-international armed
conflict into an international armed conflict, which adds another
dimension to the already-existing conflicts and ultimately results in a
prolongation and increase in the magnitude of the conflict, both
characteristics of intractable conflicts. Furthermore, the intractability of
the conflict is entrenched by the massive nature of its destructive impact,
which includes internal displacement. The UN has indicated that the
Darfur conflict is the worst humanitarian crisis in the world (United
Nations News Centre 2004). According to the UNHCR (2015), 400 000
new internal displacements were recorded between January and August
2014 alone. In January 2015, 100 000 people were displaced, bringing the
number of people in need of humanitarian assistance to 6,9 million (Crisis
Group 2015a). All these factors are exacerbated by a complete lack of
political will on the part of the current leadership to negotiate for peace.
These facts illustrate the complex nature of the Darfur conflict. Given that
the conflict has existed in various forms since at least 2003, thus for
almost 15 years, that the military rebel and government-sponsored groups
have no interest in finding a resolution and that despite all the
interventions there is no clear resolution in sight, the conflict in Darfur
clearly is an instance of intractable conflict. 
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3 Global response to the Darfur crisis
This sub-section and the one that follows are aimed at giving a narrative
overview of the different responses by the global and regional communities
to the crisis in Darfur with the aim in the final section to be able to
compare this to the responses to the South Sudan crisis in order to assess
the effectiveness of the different approaches. A number of different
strategies or measures have been employed at the global level, particularly
by the UN, in an attempt to bring about a resolution of the conflict in
Darfur, including resolutions of the Security Council, the indictment of
the President of Sudan at the ICC, and various unilateral and multi-lateral
sanctions against Sudan. 
3.1 United Nations Security Council resolutions
The first UNSC resolution on the situation in Darfur, Resolution 1547, was
adopted on 11 June 2004. Its purpose was to set up an ‘advance team’
(UNAMIS) to ‘prepare for a future United Nations peace-support operation
[in Darfur] following the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement’
(United Nations 2004a). About a month later, the UNSC demanded as per
its power under Chapter VII that ‘the government of the Sudan disarms the
Janjaweed militias’ (United Nations 2004b). However, this resolution
lacked implementation mechanisms and was ignored by the government of
Sudan mainly because for the next few months the UNSC was preoccupied
with the peace process in Southern Sudan which culminated in the signing
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005 (Prendergast &
Sullivan 2008).
Thereafter the focus shifted back to the crisis in Darfur, and in March
2005 three resolutions, Resolutions 1590 (2005), 1591 (2005) and 1593
(2005), followed in close succession. These resolutions dealt respectively
with the establishment of the UNMIS, a peace-keeping mission consisting
of 10 000 military personnel; an asset freeze and travel ban on certain
persons who were considered to have had a significant role in the Darfur
crisis; and the referral the situation in Darfur to the ICC. While these
resolutions together had the ability to bring about real change in the
region, some factors prevented any meaningful action to flow from them.
One of the most important reasons is that there was division among the P5
(the five permanent members of the Security Council) about the way in
which to approach the situation, leading to the abstention of Russia and
China from these resolutions (Prendergast & Sullivan 2008). There have
even been allegations that China was supporting the government of Sudan
and was providing them with fighter jets and training (Prendergast &
Sullivan 2008). Without agreement among the P5, it is unlikely that any
real action will follow on the implementation of resolutions, as was indeed
the case. Second, there was no consultation with the African states on
these resolutions, with the result that they also were reluctant to co-
operate with the UNSC (Prendergast & Sullivan 2008).
In 2006 the negotiations seemed to start paying off, and the Abuja Peace
Agreement was signed in May 2006 between the government of Sudan and
one of the large rebel groups. However, this agreement was not signed by
two of the smaller rebel groups (United Nations 2005). The UN
maintained its peace-keeping forces on the ground, and in late 2006 it was
decided that the UN should launch a joint mission with the AU. However,
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it took until July 2007 for the requisite resolution, Resolution 1769 (2007)
to be adopted by the UNSC. This was the first time such a joint mission
was attempted, and it was the biggest UN mission after that in the Balkans
(Prendergast & Sullivan 2008). Yet from the beginning there was a
continued power struggle within the UNAMID, with the UN continuing to
blame the AU for any failures and insisting that it was primarily a UN
mission since it had been constituted by a UN resolution (Prendergast &
Sullivan 2008). In 2011, through Resolution 1997 (2011), the UNSC
recalled UNMIS in order to leave UNAMID as the only UNSC-constituted
body present in Sudan.
The security situation in Darfur continued to deteriorate, and while
UNAMID was there as a peace-keeping mission, there was no peace to
keep and they repeatedly failed in their main mandate of ensuring the
protection of civilians (Prendergast & Sullivan 2008; Abdulbari (2015).
Members of UNAMID were also killed, and blame is unofficially attributed
to the government of Sudan (Prendergast & Sullivan 2008). In 2011 a
further peace agreement, the Doha Document for Peace (DDP), was signed
between the government of Sudan and the Liberation and Justice
Movement providing for power sharing and a compensation fund for
victims of the conflict in Darfur. This was intended to bring peace to the
region, but conflict, human rights violations and internal displacement
continued. The escalating violence in Darfur in February 2014 led to the
adoption of UNSC Resolution 2148 (2014) in April 2014 in which the
mandate of UNAMID was revised to focus on the following three priority
areas: the protection of civilians; mediation between the government of
Sudan and non-signatory armed movements; and support for the
mediation of community conflict. In February 2016, there was a new bout
of hostilities which led to tens of thousands of civilians fleeing their homes
in Darfur (United Nations Human Rights Council 2016a). As can be seen
from this exposition, the Security Council has been highly involved in the
situation in Dakar, albeit often not with the required results – sending
large peace-keeping troops, working together with the AU in a manner
which had never before been attempted and even going so far as to refer
the matter to the ICC.
3.2 International Criminal Court
The resolution of the UNSC in 2005 referring the conflict in Darfur to the
ICC led to retaliation by the government of Sudan through the expulsion
of all Western aid groups from Darfur (International Coalition for the
Responsibility to Protect 2015). However, the fact that both China and
Russia abstained in this decision and the fact that very little funding was
provided for the prosecution process, indicate that from the outset there
was no clear commitment by the P5 to ensure the success of the legal
process. Further, the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government
resolved on 3 July 2009 not to co-operate with the ICC as it felt its
concerns had been ignored by the UNSC, such as the potentially negative
impact of the arrest warrant against Al-Bashir on the ongoing peace
processes in Sudan, and the fact that they viewed the warrant as a violation
of customary international law related to the immunity of sitting heads of
state (Mekuriyaw 2016: 119). The resolution of the Assembly of Heads of
State and Government asked for a stay of prosecution of Al-Bashir.
However, this resolution was not acted upon by the UNSC. This lack of
co-operation and co-ordination between the regional powers and UN
THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE DARFUR AND SOUTH SUDAN CRISES                                293
bodies on efforts and initiatives to address the challenges in Darfur in a
concerted manner is a factor which has contributed to the continued
intractability of this conflict. 
The decision by the AU not to acknowledge the ICC’s warrant of arrest
has enabled the government of Sudan to act with impunity and ignore the
ICC process (Prendergast & Sullivan 2008). Various states that are party
to the Rome Statute of the ICC, such as Kenya, Uganda and South Africa,
have also failed to arrest President Omar al-Bashir when he was on their
territory. South Africa argued that this failure was due to being ‘caught
between its obligations under the Rome Statute and those that grant
immunity to heads of state’ (Ngari 2017). Initially, it seemed that no
political consequences would flow from this violation of an international
obligation. However, in a decision in December 2016 – the first of its kind
– the ICC decided to rule on whether South Africa had acted contrary to
its obligations under international law by not arresting Al-Bashir during
his visit to the country in 2015, and in July 2017 determined that South
Africa ‘had the ability to arrest and surrender him and it chose not to do
so’. However, there will be no real consequences, since the ICC did not
proceed to apply any of the measures at its disposal, such as referring the
matter to the UNSC (De Wet 2017). Similar proceedings are underway at
the ICC against Uganda (Journalists for Justice 2017). The failure by the
international community to support the process led the Prosecutor of the
ICC to announce in December 2014 that the investigation would go into
hibernation until the UNSC provides the necessary support and co-
operation (Bensouda 2014). Since then, the ICC has determined that as it
is a UNSC referral to the Court, the UN members have an obligation to co-
operate, but nothing more has come of it (International Coalition for the
Responsibility to Protect 2015).
While many African countries supported and participated in the
establishment of the ICC and have even referred cases to the ICC, the
arrest warrant against a sitting head of state was only one of the steps in
the disenchantment African states have experienced in relation to the ICC
(Mekuriyaw 2016: 119). Further criticism of the ICC by African states
include selective prosecution, with successful prosecutions being focused
disproportionately on the global south and particularly Africa (Mekuriyaw
2016: 126). This has led a number of African states, including South
Africa, to declare that they would opt out of the ICC. It is thus not
surprising that to date there has been no attempt to adhere to arrest Al-
Bashir. 
It is interesting to note that in other cases of similar internal conflicts,
the precedent is that of the institution of special mechanisms. This took
the form of special tribunals in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia and
Lebanon, an ad hoc chamber in Senegal (Cassese 2012: 495) as well as the
intended hybrid court in South Sudan. These special mechanisms have in
most cases been considered to be legitimate and have enabled the
prosecution of war criminals locally (Cassese 2012: 495). Another benefit
is that such courts or tribunals can be used in conjunction with other
transitional justice processes, such as a ‘truth commission and reparations
authority’ in order to ensure comprehensive justice processes and
reparation for the victims (Lucey & Kumalo 2017). Finally, given the
amount of backlash that the UNSC’s decision to refer the situation in
Darfur to the ICC has generated, it would in all probability also have been
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a smarter decision in terms of international relations to opt for the less
politically-loaded option of a tribunal at national level. The question thus
remains as to why in the case of Sudan the situation was referred to the
ICC rather than considering an analogous solution to those that have seen
such success in the past and that continue to be used in other situations.
One reason for this may be the continued presence of Al-Bashir as the head
of state in Sudan for more than 28 years, a person who has no interest in a
transitional justice process that would see him being prosecuted for
genocide and other massive human rights violations. Another reason may
be that while tribunals have generally been set up in countries where the
majority of the country had been involved in the violence, either as
perpetrators or victims, in the case of Darfur, this is a small region of a vast
country, which means that most parts of the country remain relatively
unaffected.
3.3 Sanctions
Apart from the purely political steps discussed above, one of the ways in
which the international community displays its dissatisfaction with a
particular country, in a manner that may have far-reaching implications, is
through the imposition of sanctions. The UNSC during an extraordinary
meeting in Nairobi in 2004 attempted to impose sanctions on Sudan, but
because of the interests of China and Russia in the Sudanese oil industry,
this attempt failed (Global Policy Forum). However, UNSC Resolution
1564/2004 stated that if Sudan did not co-operate, particularly with the
AU monitors, the UNSC ‘would consider taking additional measures,
including sanctions, to affect Sudan’s oil sector and the government or its
individual members’ (United Nations 2004c). These threats were followed
through in one of the 2005 trio resolutions, as referred to above. However,
the effectiveness was limited in that the expert panel which was to
determine to which persons the travel ban and asset freeze would apply
took more than a year to be set up (Prendergast & Sullivan 2008). Even
after the panel submitted 17 names to the UNSC, no meaningful action
was taken (Prendergast & Sullivan 2008). The sanctions against people
blocking peace in countries such as Sudan were been renewed in April
2016 (Sudan Tribune 2016). Thus, the success of sanctions by the UN,
even where they go beyond mere threats or warnings and are effected, is
called into question by the lack of willpower displayed in their
enforcement. Often individual states do not abide by UN-imposed
sanctions and continue their relations with them, with the result that these
measures are further undermined. 
Arguably, the unilateral coercive measures (UCM) taken by various
states against an individual state are much more effective, particularly
where these states are important trading partners. In the case of Sudan,
states that imposed such UCMs include the United States of America (US),
the United Kingdom and the European Union. Some of these UCMs,
particularly those of the US (which were finally lifted in October 2017
after having been in place for 20 years (Dahir 2017) are of a
comprehensive nature, meaning that they do not target specific persons
but apply to the whole country (Saeed 2015). These sanctions include
trade embargoes, which block the transfer of money to Sudan and limit
access to vital technological tools (Sperber 2014). Since this is not in line
with the approach followed by the UNSC which aims to target specific
persons, rather than the country as a whole in order not to cause undue
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and unfair suffering (United Nations Human Rights Council 2015), in
December 2015 the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and
International Sanctions called on states to review these policies, given that
they appeared to have had no effect on the elite and disproportionately
affected the poor (Prendergast & Sullivan 2008). Perhaps heeding this call,
but also taking into account the political situation and the strategic
position of Sudan as a partner in their fight against terrorism, the US lifted
the harshest trade embargoes in October 2017 after a 16-month review
period. While this is good news for the people of Sudan on an economic
front, it also brings to an end one of the most serious political sanctions
against the country.
4 Regional response to the Darfur crisis
4.1 Role of the African Union in the conflict in Darfur
Apart from the efforts by the global community led by the UN to address
the conflict in Darfur, using some of the most ‘serious’ tools at its disposal,
including extensive peace-keeping missions and even going so far as to
indict the President of Sudan, the AU was similarly taking action. The AU
is the 55-member continental political body formed in 2001 to replace the
Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The AU has been actively involved
in the peace process in the conflict in Sudan in line with its objective
under article 3(f) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union to ‘promote
peace, security and stability on the continent’. These efforts, however, have
not been successful, probably due to the AU’s lack of resources and lack of
political will by member states (Keith 2007: 153). For example, the AU
peace-keeping mission sent to Sudan (African Union Mission in Sudan
(AMIS)), did not function adequately and efficiently due to underfunding
and understaffing (Keith 2007: 154).
Furthermore, the AU has been disparaged as a ‘club of dictators’ who do
not generally respond to violations of human rights, but rather are
concerned with securing the sovereignty of their own states by insisting on
the doctrine of non-interference (Gottschalk & Schimdt 2004: 139). Apart
from the reasons given by the AU for rejecting the decision of the ICC to
indict Al-Bashir, discussed above, one of the reasons often cited why the
AU has refused to co-operate with the ICC is that they are ‘protecting one
of their own’. This attitude is also on display during review processes, such
as the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of the UN, where states are given
the opportunity to engage their peers on issues of concern in their
countries. It is the custom of African states in this and similar fora not to
criticise each other and to ‘stick together’. For example, despite the many
issues that they may have raised, none of the African states raised any
issues during Sudan’s UPR process in 2011. This general trend of lack of
political will to support processes which may have negative implications
for their peers may to some extent explain the failure by heads of state to
invoke article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act, which gives the AU the
mandate to intervene in a member state in respect of grave circumstances
such as war and genocide. The failure of the AU to utilise this power,
which is one of the key characteristics distinguishing the AU from the
non-interventionist nature of its predecessor, has been a contributing
factor to the prolongation of some of the most protracted situations on the
continent. 
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Not much diplomatic pressure has been exerted by the AU on Sudan’s
President Omar al-Bashir to resolve the crisis. The AU went to the extent
of allowing Sudan to host its annual summit in 2006 amidst the crisis,
despite its rules of procedure that require the summit to take place in a
conducive political atmosphere (Udombana 2005: 1188), which only
served as an endorsement of his regime. Al-Bashir was also allowed to visit
and leave South Africa despite a South African court order for his arrest
(Aljazeera 2015). As late as November 2017, a case brought by civil society
in Uganda to arrest Al-Bashir when he was visiting the country was
dismissed by a Ugandan court on the basis that it was ‘unnecessary’, since
‘Uganda is awaiting sanctions by the UN Security Council for failing to
arrest President Bashir in May [2016]’ (New Vision 2017).
4.2 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African
Commission) is the body mandated to promote and protect human and
peoples’ rights and interpret the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights (African Charter). The Commission has played a critical role in the
crisis in Sudan, but it can only adopt recommendations, the binding nature
of which is disputed as the African Commission is a quasi-judicial body.
For example, the Commission undertook a fact-finding mission to Darfur
in 2004 and established that there were massive human rights violations
committed by armed militias, some of them supported by the government,
which included the killing and rape of civilians (African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights 2004a). The Sudanese government responded
to the report by insisting that it was taking all steps possible to protect
human rights in the conflict and, as such, it considered the report as
reflecting unsubstantiated allegations mainly peddled by the media
(Government of Sudan 2005). Despite this reaction from the government
and the failure by the AU to implement the African Commission’s
recommendations, the findings contributed to exposing the situation on
the ground to the international community.
The African Commission has also passed a number of resolutions
calling upon all parties to the conflict to desist from preventing
humanitarian assistance missions to the civilian populations (African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 2004b) and urging President
Bashir to co-operate with the investigations by the ICC prosecutor (African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 2005). It is worth noting that
the AU resolved in 2009 not to co-operate with the ICC due to what it
considered a lack of consultation by the UNSC when referring the Darfur
crisis to the ICC and the threat such action posed to any peace efforts.
While the actions of the African Commission are commendable, the
effectiveness of its decisions depends upon the AU. In terms of article 59,
all measures taken within the provisions of the African Charter remain
confidential until such time as the Assembly decides otherwise. This
implies that the Commission on its own does not have the power to
implement its own recommendations. This can only be done by the AU,
which has been described above as lacking the political will.
One of the measures at its disposal which has not been employed by the
African Commission is the procedure in article 58 of the African Charter.
In terms of this article, the Commission has to refer cases of serious or
massive human rights violations to the Assembly of Heads of State of the
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AU (Assembly), following which the Assembly can direct the Commission
to do an in-depth study of the case. However, to date the Commission has
been hesitant to use the procedure under article 58, partly because of the
tendency of the heads of African states to show solidarity and not to
expose each other’s failings. 
4.3 African Peer Review Mechanism and the African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights
The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is a mutual and voluntary
self-monitoring programme of AU member states aimed at promoting and
reinforcing high standards of governance. The mandate of the APRM is to
ensure that the policies and practices of participating countries conform to
the agreed values in the following four focus areas: democracy and
political governance; economic governance; corporate governance; and
socio-economic development (New Partnership for Africa’s Development
2004). Sudan is a voluntary member of the APRM. The APRM undertook a
mission in January 2016 to Sudan upon the invitation of Sudan. However,
this had nothing to do with the crisis in Darfur, but was rather a pre-
country review mission with the aim of having an appreciation of the
National Dialogue currently taking place as part of the APRM procedural
phases (African Peer Review Mechanism 2016). The voluntary nature of
the mechanism makes it less effective as the APRM heads of state often
avoid criticising one another in order to avoid provocation and retaliation.
Sudan signed the Protocol Establishing the African Court on 9 May
1998, but has not ratified the Protocol. While the decisions of the Court
are binding on members who have accepted its jurisdiction, the Court has
no jurisdiction over Sudan as the latter has not ratified the relevant
Protocol. Therefore, the Court cannot adjudicate over the crisis in Darfur.
4.4 Failed AU-UN joint mediation
Negotiations on the Darfur crisis started in 2003 with an AU-UN peace
initiative led by the then Chadian President, Idriss Deby, and this process
led to a 45-day ceasefire agreement between the government and SLM in
September 2003 (Netabay 2009). However, both parties soon violated the
ceasefire and problems of impartiality on the side of the mediator led to a
failure of the process (Netabay 2009). In 2004 the same mediation team
managed to negotiate a ceasefire agreement for humanitarian assistance. A
comprehensive mediation process began in 2004 in Abuja, Nigeria,
initiated by the UN Security Council which assigned the AU to undertake
the negotiations (International Crisis Group 2014).
The AU team was led by the then President of Nigeria, Olusegun
Obosanjo. However, because of attacks by the government on Darfur, the
rebel groups refused to finalise the negotiations (Netabay 2009). At the
same time, the UN and the government of Sudan adopted a Communiqué
on Darfur indicating the steps that should be taken by the government
(Slim 2004). The Abuja negotiations resumed in June 2005 under the
leadership of Salim Ahmed Salim, the former Secretary-General of the
OAU, and supported by the UN, the US and the UK. The government of
Sudan, the SLM and JEM were initially party to the negotiations, but only
the government and SLM signed the May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement
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(DPA) which was the agreement flowing from this negotiation (Nathan
2006: 1).
Far from leading to peace, the DPA led to an escalation of the conflict.
First, the negotiations for the DPA did not include all rebel groups or
tribal leaders and also did not take sufficient account of the perspectives of
civilians (Flint 2010: 14). During the negotiations, there was a split in the
SLM, and the leader who signed the DPA was not regarded by all in the
rebel group as a legitimate representative, thereby leading to internal
conflict in this group (Flint 2010: 9). A second failure of the DPA is that it
included deadlines for elections and referenda that were not practical
(Nathan 2006: 4). In general, the process of the peace agreement for the
DPA was rushed as the EU and the governments supporting the mediation
threatened to withdraw support unless an agreement was reached
expeditiously (Nathan 2006: 4). Thus JEM, which represents one of the
largest ethnic groups in Darfur, rejected the DPA because in an attempt to
finish before the deadline, the mediators drafted an agreement without
sufficient input from the parties (Nathan 2006: 5). Therefore, the DPA was
a fatal agreement that did not settle the conflict in Darfur; rather, it led to
the perpetuation of the conflict as the rebel groups that were not
represented in the mediation process joined forces and attacked the
government and SLM (Taddele 2007).
Another negotiation attempt was launched in 2007 under joint AU-UN
leadership (Brosché 2008: 59). These negotiations took place in Libya, and
this venue was contested. Other contested issues were the approach to be
followed and the team involved as well as the lack of political will to
implement agreements (Brosché 2008: 61). This process was postponed
due to a lack of participation by main rebel leaders in the peace process
(Netabay 2009). In addition, the leaders of the mediation team had
different perspectives on the approach to be followed, which led to conflict
within the mediation team (International Crisis Group 2014). A new joint
UN-AU mediation team was established in June 2008, but was soon
followed by the AU establishing a High-Level Panel on Darfur. Thereafter,
the UN-AU mediation continued in Doha, Qatar, in 2009. During the
mediation the international community facilitated the establishment of an
umbrella group for the rebels called the Liberation and Justice Movement
(LJM) in order to overcome the fragmentation of rebel groups, but this
initiative was rejected by many of the groups (International Crisis Group
2014). Despite this, the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) was
adopted in May 2011. On 14 July 2011, the government of Sudan and LJM
signed a protocol highlighting their commitment to the DDPD. In
September 2012, JEM was split and a splinter group led by Mohamed
Bashir Ahmed (JEM-Bashir) was created, which signed the DDPD in Doha
in March 2013 (Sudan Tribune 2013). However, to date the other JEM
faction and the two SLM groups have not signed any agreement with the
government of Sudan. 
The peace negotiations for Darfur did not persuade the main rebel
groups and the majority of the Darfur population, who continue to boycott
these processes and initiatives. The peace negotiations thus have failed to
address the communal conflict and to build trust among the parties
involved in the conflict. More devastating is the lack of implementation of
the agreements by the government. This has deteriorated the trust of the
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rebel groups as well as the Darfur population and has contributed to the
continued intractability of the situation.
On 23 March 2016, the government of Sudan and opposition forces
signed an agreement for inclusive dialogue to serve as a practical way
forward towards ensuring progress in the negotiations on cessation and
permanent ceasefire in the conflict (African Union 2016a). While this is
not the same as a peace agreement, and while it was only the first step in a
long process towards the resolution of this intractable conflict, perhaps
this presents renewed hope for an AU intervention. While in 2016 there
were shocking accusations of the use of chemical weapons by the
government on communities in Darfur (Al Jezeera 2016), by 2017 the
‘level of armed hostilities in Darfur has continued to be significantly lower
than in previous years’ mainly due to a major military victory of the
Sudanese government in September 2016 (Security Council Report 2017).
However, the inclusive dialogue process, which came to an end in October
2016, was rejected by a large opposition coalition, including the leader of
JEM who stated that this ‘inclusive dialogue’ in fact excludes some
opposition and civil society groups and has resulted in a partial political
process (Sudan Tribune 2016), again highlighting the ever-divided nature
of any processes undertaken in relation to Darfur.
5 Conclusion on Darfur
Following the path of intractability discussed earlier, the conflict in Darfur
has passed the eruption, escalation, failed peace-keeping and
institutionalisation phases and, as such, continues to be an intractable
conflict. The military victory of the Sudanese government over some of the
rebel groups in Darfur in 2017 has seen the start of a phase of de-
escalation of violence in the area. However, this ceasefire is not the result
of sustainable transitional justice, and it thus remains to be seen whether it
will be possible to go from there into the recovery phase – the final phase
in the resolution of an intractable conflict – or whether it is just a
momentary lull, whereafter the rebel forces will regain their strength and
the conflict will continue. It is clear from the discussion above that single
efforts by individual actors have failed to resolve the conflict, and so have
the unco-ordinated efforts of the various actors. Despite the variety of
international responses as well as various mechanisms to resolve the
conflict in Darfur, the situation remains unresolved. The international
responses have failed due to a lack of co-ordination at the regional and
global level. Furthermore, the attempted responses have neglected the
civilian population, who continue to face displacement and a lack of access
to basic services, and who are not fully integrated into the discussions on
peace, such as the inclusive dialogue. The international community has
thus failed to deliver on its responsibility to protect the population in
Darfur (De Waal 2007: 1054). Furthermore, because the current ceasefire
is the result of a military victory, this means that one of the main reasons
why the conflict arose in the first place, namely, the marginalisation of the
people of Darfur as well as scarce food resources, has not been addressed,
with the result that most displaced people have not been able to return
home. The conflict should be addressed in a comprehensive rather than
piecemeal manner (Slim 2004). Therefore, more co-ordination and
partnership among the various actors at the regional and global levels is
necessary. Further, while it is important that the negotiation should give
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priority to ceasefire agreements to end violence, the international
community should also focus on strong negotiations that address the root
causes of the conflict (Slim 2004). The start of the resolution of this
intractable conflict may have taken place with almost a year of vastly lower
conflict rates. However, the international community cannot allow itself to
be lulled into a false sense of security. The decision by the UN to remove
almost a third of its peace-keeping troops at the end of 2017 may upset
this delicate balance (Sengupta (2017). The lack of trust among the
opposing groups also remains. How can the international community work
together to contribute to sustainable peace in Darfur? It may be possible
that valuable lessons may be learnt from the approach of the international
community to the conflict in neighbouring South Sudan. 
6 South Sudan crisis: A regional and global complementary 
response
6.1 Historical background to the South Sudan crisis
The history of conflict in South Sudan can be traced to pre-independence
Sudan, particularly the sunset years of colonialism (Kebbede 1997: 27).
The mostly Christian south, which had been administered separately from
Juba during colonial times, expressed fear that unification with the
predominantly Muslim Arab north following independence would result in
its marginalisation (Peace Direct 2015). These concerns were ignored, and
Sudan declared an independent state on 1 January 1956 incorporating the
south with no federal arrangement (Kebbede 1997: 20). The southerners
were soon vindicated when the new Khartoum government pursued a
policy of neglect and exclusion immediately after independence. Thus, the
discontent that began on the eve of independence soon escalated to a civil
war that lasted until 1972 when the Addis Ababa Agreement on the
Problem of South Sudan was signed on 27 February 1972 ushering in a
federal arrangement (Shinn 2005: 242). This, however, lasted only 11
years and war again broke out in 1983 when the Khartoum government
introduced Shari’a laws in the south, divided the south into three regions
and dissolved the regional assembly (Young 2012). This was propounded
by the discovery of oil in 1979, and the proceeds were channelled to the
north (Kebbede 1997: 7).
This war lasted until 6 January 2005, when the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA) was signed (United Nations Mission in South Sudan
2004) under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on
Development (IGAD), an eight-nation Horn of Africa regional economic
community. By the time the CPA was signed, the several rebel groups in
the south had coalesced into one formation, the Sudanese People’s
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) (African Union 2014a: para 41). In
line with the CPA, South Sudan gained autonomy on 9 July 2005 under Dr
John Garang as President of South Sudan and First Vice-President of
Sudan. However, Dr Garang died in a helicopter crash on 30 July 2005 and
was succeeded by his deputy, Salva Kiir, who led South Sudan to
independence on 9 July 2011 following a referendum. Dr Riek Machar
became the Deputy President. 
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6.2 Socio-political context of the current crisis
Of relevance to the current crisis is the fact that in 1991, a faction led by
Dr Riek Machar split from the SPLM/A and aligned with President Bashir’s
Khartoum government only to rejoin in 2002 towards the conclusion of
the peace process (Akol 2003: 76; Aljazeera 2014). A culmination of the
internal ideological wrangles within the SPLM/A that had by this time
taken ethnic dimensions between the Nuer and Dinka, this split has been
considered as one of the events that left deep scars within the SPLM/A
which it carried into independence (The Sudd Institute 2014; African
Union 2014a: paras 42-44). This is particularly so since the SPLM/A
pecking order had to be rearranged to accommodate Dr Machar’s return, a
fact that caused a lot of unease (African Union 2014a: para 50). This
unease was to pronounce itself progressively after the untimely death of Dr
Garang when Salva Kiir became President following the 2010 elections
with Dr Machar as his deputy (The Sudd Institute 2014). The relationship
between the two is reported to have been frosty with the two factions
running something akin to parallel governments (African Union 2014a:
paras 50-52). These political divisions sown over the decades have since
taken ethnic undertones, thereby creating divisions beyond the political
class to the general population. 
Commentators have also pointed out that the CPA largely ignored
democratisation in the rush to achieve and sustain long overdue peace,
resulting in cosmetic peace (LeRiche & Arnold 2013: 36; 132). As a result,
the world allowed the government of South Sudan significant leeway when
it failed to show commitment to democratic principles for the new nation.
The government of Salva Kiir utterly failed to strengthen institutions of
democracy (African Union 2014a: para 45). This failure saw historical
divisions go unaddressed, and healing and reconciliation take a back seat
in the new nation.
Even though the events of 15 December 2013 triggered the violence,
feelings of discontent at the government’s failure to translate the CPA into
a tangible development initiative already were rife amongst the populace
(African Union 2014a: para 70). Chiefly, the government miserably
miscalculated by failing to initiate a much-needed healing and
reconciliation process that would have helped the young nation embrace
the past and forge a path to sustainable development (Jok 2015: 8). To
compound this failure, the government failed to take advantage of the vast
oil resources in the country to address years of marginalisation and
underdevelopment resulting in high levels of poverty, unemployment and
frustration (African Union 2014a: paras 70-80). Instead, corruption was
rife in the young government leading to weak national institutions,
mismanagement of natural resources and nepotism with the end result of
an inability to provide basic social services (De Vries & Justin 2014: 3).
This compounded public frustration which only required a political
trigger. 
Things took a turn for the worse in July 2013 when President Kiir
dismissed Dr Machar together with a number of rivals from his cabinet
(Johnson 2014; African Union 2014a: para 63). Violence eventually broke
out on 15 December 2013 when President Kiir accused Dr Machar of an
attempted coup and attempted to arrest him and disarm members of the
Presidential Guard from Machar’s Nuer ethnic extraction (De Vries &
Justin 2014: 6). The AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan
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(AUCISS), however, has determined that there was no evidence of any
such coup attempt (African Union 2014a: para 68), which leads to the
conclusion that this was a purely politically-motivated decision on the part
of President Kiir to remove a democratically-elected deputy from a
different ethnic background, and whom, based on the co-operation of his
faction with the government of Sudan, he would have seen as an outsider,
in an attempt to get rid of possible rivals and opposition to his
government.
6.3 IGAD-led peace process
Being custodians of the CPA and out of a sense of responsibility for the
new nation’s well-being, IGAD swiftly responded to the dismissal of Dr
Machar by sending a delegation of its foreign ministers to Juba. The
delegation, accompanied by AU and UN representatives, assessed the
situation and recommended IGAD-led peace negotiations to commence
within ten days and called for the continued support of the AU and the UN
(Inter-Governmental Authority on Development 2013a). The UNSC
responded to this call on 24 December 2013 through Resolution 2132
(2013) by increasing the overall force levels of the United Nations Mission
in South Sudan (UNMISS) to 12 500 to protect civilians at risk and deal
with the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation. This then shifted the
mandate of the mission from providing capacity building to civilian
protection. The AU, on the other hand, directed the AU Commission to
support the IGAD-led peace process (African Union 2013a). The IGAD
Heads of State and Government (IGAD-HoS) resolved on 27 December
2013 to immediately appoint General Lazarus Sumbeiywo of Kenya and
Ambassador Seyoum Mesfin of Ethiopia to lead mediation efforts between
the rival South Sudan factions and further called upon the AU and UN to
complement the IGAD-led peace process and respond to the unfolding
humanitarian crisis (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
2013b). Complementarity in this sense thus means that the initiative and
the lead is taken by one body, IGAD, and that other international bodies,
instead of attempting completely separate and unrelated processes to
address the same conflict, or having multiple organisations who all try to
take the lead, support the initiative of a body that is closer to the ground,
thus lending legitimacy to the process and also ensuring that the
intervention has the available resources to succeed. In this regard, because
IGAD is made up out of neighbouring countries, they have a particular
interest in the stability of any state in their region, hence the swift and
effective response. However, such initiatives can only succeed with the
backing, not least financially, of bodies such as the UN and AU.
Despite a difficult start, a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoH) was
signed by the parties on 23 January 2014 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Inter-
Governmental Authority on Development 2014a) which was to be
monitored by a ceasefire Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (Inter-
Governmental Authority on Development 2014b). The UNSC, through
Resolution 2252 (2015), extended the mandate of UNMISS to 30
November 2014 with an extended mandate to support the implementation
of the CoH through, inter alia, protecting the Monitoring and Verification
Mechanism. The mandate of UNMISS has since been extended severally.
Despite the CoH and the subsequent Agreement to Resolve the Crisis in
South Sudan of 9 May 2014 (Inter-Governmental Authority on
Development 2014c), parties showed very little commitment and
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hostilities continued (Crisis Group 2015b). This prompted IGAD to
threaten collective punitive action on 10 June 2014 directing the parties to
honour the 60-day deadline for a peace agreement (Inter-Governmental
Authority on Development 2014d). The AU-PSC supported IGAD’s
position by expressing readiness to impose targeted sanctions upon IGAD’s
request two days later on 12 June 2014 (African Union 2014b). IGAD and
the AU-PSC repeated these threats two months later, this time providing a
45-day timeline for an agreement for a transitional government on national
unity (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development 2014e). However,
an agreement was not arrived at within the deadline, and the IGAD-HoS
on 7 November 2014 during its Assembly of HoS invited IGAD member
states to impose collective asset freezes, travel bans and arms embargos
against the warring parties, and called on the AU-PSC and UNSC to help
with the implementation. 
Jolted by the possibility of regional sanctions, the parties signed the
Rededication and Implementation Modalities for the CoH on 9 November
2014, basically reaffirming their commitment to implementing the CoH
(Inter-Governmental Authority on Development 2014f). With the process
back on track, the parties signed the IGAD-mediated Areas of Agreement
of the Establishment of the Transitional Government of National Unity
(TGNU) in the Republic of South Sudan on 1 February 2015 (Inter-
Governmental Authority on Development 2015a). The momentum,
however, quickly dissipated prompting the UNSC to unanimously resolve
on 3 March 2015 through Resolution 2206 (2015) to designate those
frustrating the peace process for imposition of sanctions. This was
followed by IGAD’s restructuring of its peace efforts by officially roping in
the AU, UN, IGAD Partners Forum, China, the US, UK, EU and Norway to
form IGAD-Plus as the new driving force (Crisis Group 2015b). The AU-
PSC also formally requested the UN to urgently designate individuals
under its Resolution 2206 (2015) for imposition of sanctions (African
Union 2015a), which request the UNSC honoured by imposing sanctions
on high-ranking officials of the SPLA and the SPLM/A-in-Opposition,
three from each side (United Nations 2015).
6.4 African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan
While the peace process was ongoing, a simultaneous and equally vital
process was also underway. On 30 December 2013, and for the first time
in the history of the AU, and indeed that of its predecessor, the OAU, the
AU directed the AU Commission and the African Commission to establish
a commission of inquiry, the AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan
(AUCISS), to investigate human rights violations and other abuses during
the South Sudan conflict and to make recommendations for ensuring
accountability, reconciliation and healing (African Union 2013a). 
The above decision is also significant for the reason that the AU
directed the AU Commission to work with the African Commission on this
despite the fact that South Sudan was at the time the only AU member not
party to the African Charter, which created the African Commission. Had
South Sudan been a party to the African Charter, the African Commission
would have been in a position to undertake a fact-finding mission to South
Sudan such as the one to Darfur discussed above. The Commission would
also have been able to entertain communications concerning South
Sudan’s failure to address the historical human rights violations from the
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liberation struggle, the effects of which sowed the seeds for the current
conflict. Hopefully, its recommendations would have helped avert the
relapse into violence. 
The AUCISS, however, stepped in where the African Commission had
no jurisdiction, completed its investigations and presented its final report
on 24 July 2015 to the AU-PSC (African Union 2015). The AU-PSC felt
that it would not be prudent to immediately publish the report in light of
the ongoing IGAD peace process. The final report of AUCISS was released
on 26 September 2015. It identified the underlying causes of the conflict
and implicated both parties in wide-spread and systematic human rights
abuses, including massacres, the recruitment of child soldiers and sexual
violence against women. Finally, the report recommended addressing the
economic sources of the conflict; justice for the victims through
institutional reform; reconciliation and holding accountable those with the
greatest responsibility for the atrocities; and disarmament, demobilisation
and reintegration of the various armed groups 
6.5 Peace Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic 
of South Sudan
On 17 August 2015 the IGAD-Plus mediation produced the Agreement on
the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (Peace
Agreement) (United Nations Mission in South Sudan 2015). The Peace
Agreement provides for a transitional government of national unity
(TGNU) with President Salva Kiir remaining President and the rebel
faction of Dr Machar selecting the First Vice-President, ostensibly Dr Riek
Machar. The TGNU was to last for 30 months, at the end of which period
elections were to be held. Further, the Peace Agreement established a
permanent ceasefire, the unification of forces and a multi-stakeholder Joint
Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) to monitor its
implementation. Significantly, the agreement also provided for the Hybrid
Court for South Sudan (Hybrid Court) to be established by the AU with
jurisdiction to prosecute those responsible for international crimes
committed during the conflict. Both parties signed the Peace Agreement
and, to complement its implementation, the UNSC on 9 October 2015
extended the mandate of UNMISS with an enhanced force ceiling of
13 000 through Resolutions 2241 (2015) and 2252 (2015).
The delayed arrival of Dr Machar in the capital, Juba, initially raised
concerns over commitment to the peace process and delayed the swearing
in of the TGNU. As a result, the UNSC, through Resolution 2280 (2016)
of 7 April 2016, renewed the sanctions it had earlier imposed in a bid to
increase the pressure on the parties to expedite the formation of the
TGNU. Dr Machar eventually arrived in Juba on 26 April 2016 and was
sworn in as First Vice-President (United Nations News Centre 2016). 
6.6 Healing and reconciliation
As discussed above, the lack of a healing and reconciliation process is one
of the underlying causes of the current crisis in South Sudan. In
recognition, the AUCISS recommended that for sustainable peace to be
achieved in South Sudan, a healing and reconciliation process ought to be
undertaken with urgency to address divisions and injustices of the
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liberation struggle which have been considerably deepened by the current
conflict (African Union 2014a: cap IV).
There are growing AU efforts towards a continental framework on
healing and reconciliation as an appropriate transitional justice option for
post-conflict states. Thus far, the AU has developed the Policy on
Post‐Conflict Reconstruction and Development, and commissioned a
report on the role of national reconciliation in peace-building and
development (African Union 2013b). The AU Panel of the Wise has also
documented the use of justice and reconciliation in African (African Union
2013c). The African Commission passed Resolution 235 on transitional
justice in Africa on 23 April 2013 in which it considered the Transitional
Justice Policy Framework by the AU and tasked a commissioner to prepare
a study on transitional justice in Africa, one of the objectives being to
determine the role of the African Commission in implementing the AU
framework and how the Commission can assist in the transitional justice
system in Africa. The study was extended for a further two years through
Resolution 278, and the report is due in May 2016 for consideration by the
African Commission.
AUCISS recommended the establishment of a truth and reconciliation
commission modelled along the AU’s recommendation of infusing
traditional forms of reconciliation and accountability (African Union
2014a: paras 977-979; African Union 2013b: para 12). This
recommendation has been incorporated in the Peace Agreement which
provides for the establishment of the Commission for Truth,
Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH) to investigate human rights and other
violations dating back to a determined period since the Sudan civil war
with a view to promoting truth, healing and reconciliation (United Nations
Mission in South Sudan 2015: cap V). In this regard, the CTRH is obliged
to adopt best practices from Africa and beyond. This peace and
reconciliation process in South Sudan, therefore, not only has AU
goodwill, but also substantial AU expert material to work with.
6.7 Conclusion on Sudan
As a postscript, it is important to note that the crisis in South Sudan is far
from over. Subsequent to the presentation of this paper, Kiir and Machar
again fell out in July 2016, leading to Machar again fleeing South Sudan
and controversially being replaced by Taban Deng Gai as First Vice-
President. These developments have made the situation even more fragile.
Fighting between government forces and several armed opposition groups,
some loyal to Machar, still rages. Once again, IGAD is leading a process it
has dubbed the High Level Revitalisation Forum for the Implementation of
the Peace Agreement which aims at achieving recommitment to the 2015
Peace Agreement. At the same time, the IGAD heads of state, the AU and
the UNSC have co-operated in marshalling a Regional Protection Force to
secure Juba and free up UN peacekeepers to enable them to spread out to
the countryside. 
The progress made in South Sudan before the event of July 2016 is
attributable to the co-operation and complementarity exercised by the
IGAD, the AU, the UN and other stakeholders. While this initial success
may appear to have been eroded by events post-July 2016, significant hope
remains in the IGAD-led process of revitalising the Peace Agreement,
backed by the AU and the UN. As this process slowly gains traction, it is
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important to note the transitional justice mechanisms provided for under
the Peace Agreement and the progress, if any, so far made in their
implementation. Notably, the Peace Agreement provides for the
establishment of an AU-mandated hybrid court to investigate and
prosecute those responsible for international crimes committed during the
conflict (United Nations Mission in South Sudan 2015: cap V). The UN
Human Rights Office (UNHRO) released a report on 10 March 2016
confirming the massive human rights violations highlighted in the AUCISS
report and recommending to the UNSC to consider referring the matter of
South Sudan to the ICC should the AU fail to expeditiously establish the
hybrid court (United Nations Human Rights Council 2016b). The same
concerns have been raised by the Commission on Human Rights in South
Sudan established by the UN Human Rights Council in March 2016. The
above reports and recommendations are quite significant as they serve to
impress upon the AU the urgency of establishing the hybrid court and
ensuring its functional efficiency. The AU should not consider this a
threat, but should rather embrace the unique opportunity to spearhead an
actual African solution towards South Sudan’s accountability deficit
(Nyagoah 2016). This will serve as a welcome departure from the
prevailing state of impunity around the continent to which the AU seems
blind. The AU has since made some progress in this regard and drafted the
statute for the hybrid court, which statute is currently being considered by
the transitional government of South Sudan. However, while the Peace
Agreement requires the South Sudanese Parliament to enact the statute,
the AU can invoke its powers under article 4(h) of its Constitutive Act and
establish the court should South Sudan fail to co-operate expeditiously.
The above provision empowers the AU to intervene in a member state in
the event of international crimes. 
The co-ordination of responses between IGAD, the AU and the UN
yielded some degree of success before July 2016. Hopefully, if the same co-
operation is afforded to IGAD’s latest revitalised efforts, sustainable
solutions will be found to South Sudan’s complex situation. The continued
goodwill of all these actors and the spirit of good faith, mutual respect, co-
operation and complementarity are necessary to ensure that South Sudan
recommits to the Peace Agreement, co-operates with the hybrid court and
ensures the effective operation of the CTRH and domestic traditional
justice efforts in order to deliver justice to victims of this senseless conflict
and nurture sustainable peace and stability. 
7 Conclusion and lessons learnt
The article sought to explore the intractable human rights situation in
Sudan and the potential of the current South Sudan crisis to become an
intractable human rights situation. In this regard, the article has compared
the international interventions and exposed the major points of divergence
between the responses in the two situations. While international efforts by
different actors, such as the UN and the AU, to solve the Darfur crisis have
been largely unco-ordinated, the response to the South Sudanese crisis has
been a co-ordinated effort by the sub-regional bloc IGAD, the AU, the UN
and the international community in general. The result has been that,
while suspicion and a lack of trust between the various stakeholders in
Darfur have resulted in the situation becoming intractable with no
foreseeable solution, the co-ordination and complementarity in
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stakeholders’ responses to South Sudan initially resulted in a fragile
ceasefire, the formation of a unity government and a shaky beginning of a
process to accountability, peace, healing and reconciliation. 
Intractable situations, however, can be resolved. While the most
effective way is to have preventive policies to prevent the occurrence of
intractable conflict, Darfur has long passed that stage. In the case of
Darfur, the aim should be to interrupt and try to reduce the intractability.
In addressing this, parties should first reach an agreement to permanently
end the violence, instead of the current unstable situation where a
ceasefire was imposed by the government through military victory. This
does not necessarily mean that the situation has been resolved, but it can
be reduced while negotiations are ongoing. South Sudan served as a good
example of how this could work. A good step in this regard would be for
the government of Sudan to stop its support for militia groups taking part
in the conflict; to support a demilitarisation of the region and a de-
escalation of hostilities. Second, the effort of stakeholders, both inter-
governmental and non-governmental organisations, should focus on the
development of peace to deinstitutionalise the conflict, that is, to provide
an alternative livelihood for those who are the front warriors. In order to
address the root cause of the problem and achieve healing, the parties
involved in the conflict as well as third parties should aim at policies that
can address the grievances that led to the conflict in the first place. 
These are processes which to date have not received sufficient attention
in the Darfur crisis. The ICC process has been stalled, and even if it were
to go ahead, a criminal prosecution may ensure accountability to some
extent for those in the highest office, but it would not bring healing and
reconciliation to the nation as a whole. The suggestion made above that a
comprehensive justice and reconciliation process be set up through the
establishment of a special tribunal, in conjunction with a truth and
reconciliation commission and a reparations mechanism, may go some
way to seeing a consolidation of the dividends of the ceasefire. These
efforts, however, can be achieved only if all stakeholders are on board, and
given the mistrust which continues to exist between civilians and rebel
groups, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, as well as the
continued failure of the joint AU-UN initiatives to bring about any real
change, this may be a long shot in the case of Darfur. However, a process
similar to that in South Sudan, which is led by a sub-regional body with
the support of the larger international community, may be the best way to
proceed. Such negotiations, however, would have to make a greater effort
to ensure that all concerned feel included in the process, and that the
outcome results in material improvements for those on the ground.
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